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CONTRACT LAW AND THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT: WHY EFFICIENCYMAXIMIZATION PRINCIPLES CAN
NEITHER EXPLAIN NOR JUSTIFY
THE EXPECTATION DAMAGES REMEDY
Robin Bradley Kar*
Do the deep principles that govern the relationships between
private individuals under the law differ from those that govern the
relationships between private individuals and the government in our
legal system? One of the subtle, if sometimes unnoticed, effects that
the law and economics movement has had on our legal culture is to
suggest an affirmative answer to this question. This answer is,
however, not only wrong, but it has also helped to produce a
distorted-and even alienated-conception of what our relationships
with one another consist in, both in the marketplace and in many
other areas of private interaction.
In this article, I will begin to challenge this conception. The
conception at issue arises most fundamentally from facts about the
relative explanatory success that the law and economics paradigm
has had in accounting for traditional areas of private as opposed to
public law. Before describing my specific strategy of argumentation
here, it will therefore help to clarify what precisely this targeted
conception is, and how facts about the law and economics movement
have contributed to it.
Consider, in this regard, the traditional distinction between
''private law" and "public law." Although a number of people have
* Associate Professor of Law, Deputy Director, Center for Interdisciplinary and
Comparative Jurisprudence, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., Harvard University; J.D.,
Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of Michigan. I would like to thank the following people,
whose thoughts and conversations have greatly influenced this piece: Elizabeth Anderson, Bryan
Camp, Brietta Clark, Stephen Darwall, Alexandra Natapoff, Timothy Oppelt, Peter Railton,
Jennifer Rothman and Lauren Willis. The following participants at the 2007 Prawfsfest also
provided helpful comments: Tommy Crocker, David Fagundes, Carissa Hessick, Zak Kramer,
Dan Markel, Gowri Ramachandran, Jason Solomon, Steven Vladeck and Ekow Yankah.
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questioned the importance of this distinction,' the distinction is itself
easy to draw. Black's Law Dictionary defines the "private law" as

that "body of law dealing with private persons and their property and
relationships." 2 Core areas of private law thus include contract law,
property law, and tort law.3 The term "public law," by contrast,
refers to "[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between
private individuals and the government, and with the structure and

operation of government itself."4
conspicuously to "constitutional
administrative law taken together."5

The term therefore refers most
law,

criminal

law,

and

In my view, this distinction is critically important for an
accurate appraisal of the large-scale impact that the law and
economics movement has had on our collective understanding of the
law. The law and economics movement has sometimes claimed
rather imperial explanatory objectives for itself,6 and its explanatory
success in any given area of the law has typically been controversial.
1. See, e.g., CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW AND PUBLIC

POLICY (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) (collecting essays that challenge the public/private divide);
Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537,
1552 (2004) (discussing feminist critiques of the public/private distinction); see also Amir N.
Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities
Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 604-17 (2001) (questioning distinction in areas of the law
apart from the family); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom,
92 GEO. L.J. 779, 807 (2004) ("While the Realists carefully worked out analytic demonstrations
of the incoherence of liberal social theory built upon the public/private distinction, what postRealist thinkers took from Realist work was not the substantive conclusion that liberal social
theory was intellectually empty, but rather a more general, pluralist idea that the choice between,
say, free markets and economic regulation was political and therefore not amenable to neutral,
principled resolution. To emphasize this point: The Realists showed that there was, analytically,
simply no such thing as an unregulated, free market. The post-Realist thinkers, ignoring the most
critical dimension of Realist work, interpreted the 'holding' of Realism to be that the choice
between markets and regulation was political, and therefore it was illegitimate for the Court to
impose the choice as a matter of constitutional law.").
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004) ("Private Law").
3. See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzchild, Keeping It Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 679
(2007) ("In a common law country, private law would translate, more or less, to the law of tort,
contract, property, inheritance, as well as many aspects of family and commercial law.").
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1267 ("Public Law").
5. Id.
6. Richard Posner has, for example, displayed incredibly broad explanatory ambitions in
this regard. See Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Private Choices and Public Law:
Richard A. Posner's Contributions to Family Law and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 403, 404 (2001) ("Richard Posner's contribution to the field of law and economics is
exceptional, not in the least for the boundless scope of its applications, ranging from the history
and evolution of legal systems to the study of substantive, procedural, and constitutional
doctrines.").
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Still, there is no doubt that-at least in broadstrokes-the paradigm
has had much greater relative success in explaining areas of private
as opposed to public law. To date, there are robust and penetrating
economic accounts of contract law,7 property law,8 and tort law,9 and
these accounts not only vie with, but often purport to outperform, the
leading alternative rights-based accounts of these doctrinal areas.
Attempts to articulate economic accounts of constitutional law,
criminal law, and administrative law have, by contrast, typically
proven far less successful. In these areas of the law, principles of
justice and fairness often appear to trump considerations of
efficiency. Accordingly, these relations are often better understood
as reflecting a more basic social contract between individuals and the
govemment-i.e., one that guarantees that some measure of justice
and fairness constrains these relations. 0
It would be impossible to know in advance whether some or all
of our legal doctrines can be explained in terms of any one deep
principle, whether contractualist or consequentialist. When we find
ourselves able to account for broad swatches of doctrine in terms of
one or another such principle, that fact will, however, typically tell us
something important about the basic commitments that are at play in
our modern legal culture. The present state of affairs can thus
contribute to the following conception. Principles of justice and
fairness significantly, and perhaps ineliminably, govern the legal
relations that individuals have with government in our modern legal
system, in part because these relations are themselves reflective of a
more basic social contract. Principles of justice and fairness have no
primary application, however, when we turn to areas of the private
law, which govern the relationships that private individuals have
with one another. These relationships are instead governed by a
principle of efficiency maximization, which has a number of
distinctive properties.
7. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000)
(providing an exposition of basic microeconomics with applications to property, contracts and
torts); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989)
(same).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. It is for this reason that John Rawls' basic account of justice as fairness has, on the
whole, provided a much more penetrating account of our basic constitutional liberties than the
law and economics movement has been able to articulate. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
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First, the
principle
of efficiency
maximization
is
consequentialist in nature:" it identifies the right rules for governing
our private relationships with one another by assessing the typical
consequences that these rules will have for the production of a
particular stated end, namely, efficiency.
Second-and as a
corollary-the principle treats private persons as merely fungible
means to this stated end. It thereby fails to respect the separateness
of persons, and fails to respect what is special about our distinctive
relationships with one another.' 2
Third, the principle excludes
considerations of justice and fairness from the relevant legal
calculus, thereby suggesting that any legal doctrines that reflect
concern for these principles represent alien intrusions into the basic
subject matter of the private law. The domain of private law
marches to the beat of a very different drum, on this view, and our
private relations simply are not appropriately governed by the same
considerations of justice and fairness that typically govern our
relationships with the state.
This, then, is the conception that I will be challenging. It views
the legal landscape as containing an important divide, with the law
that governs our private relationships on one side, and the law that
governs our relationships with the government on the other. The
divide is, moreover, one of fundamental principle.
The deep
principles that animate the public law are viewed as having a
decidedly contractualist bent to them, whereas the deep principles
that animate the private law are viewed as fundamentally
consequentialist in nature.
Before continuing, I should stress that my claim here is
emphatically not that this conception has garnered anything like
widespread consensus, or even that it is particularly plausible in the
final analysis. To my mind, the conception would, in fact, appear
extraordinarily difficult to defend from any plausible normative
11. "Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view that normative properties depend
only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different
normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is
consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally
right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the
motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind." Walter SinnottArmstrong, Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed., Spring ed. 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/consequentialism.
12. For the classic discussion of this feature of consequentialist accounts of the right, see
RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 23-25, 163-64.
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of efficiency-

maximization to be normatively foundational, there should, for
example, be no obvious reason to limit application of this principle to
the traditional areas of private law. Theorists in this vein should
presumably decide instead whether private individuals or the
government should have the standing to enforce any particular legal
rule by simply determining which rule (here, of standing) would be

more conducive to efficiency maximization. 3 For modem liberal
theorists, on the other hand, who espouse a fundamentally
contractualist account of justice, there might be a number of
plausible grounds to distinguish between the so-called public and
private domains, and to resist governmental regulation of the private
domain. 4 No such rationales could, however, support the particular
conception under discussion here, because this conception deems the
relations that are governed by the private law not as appropriately
free from governmental regulation but rather as appropriately
regulated by a distinctive, consequentialist conception of the right.
In addition, there are a number of deontological accounts of specific
areas of the private law-such as tort law 5 and property law' 6 -that
are quite compelling in themselves.
13. For a particularly helpful discussion of these points, see Benjamin Zipursky, The
Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW § 2.1, at 624-25 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) ("These theorists recognize,
of course, that our system is set up so that private parties initiate the proceedings that culminate in
this imposition of a fine, and they are the recipients of the payment of these fines, which are
entitled 'damages' awards. But these are contingent facts of our system. . . . [T]he plaintiffdriven structure of private litigation is a contingent feature of private law, on this view. It is often
the case that the persons who suffer injuries as a result of the violation of liability rules are the
most efficient sources of evidence with regard to the violation. Hence, there is value in providing
such persons with an incentive to attempt to enforce the liability rule. The prospect of being the
recipient of the defendant's liability provides the incentive. That is the primary reason why, at
least in torts, victims are permitted to sue.").
14. Symposium on the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982) (using
"private" in reference to subjects that lie beyond government regulation); Morton J. Horowitz,
The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv.1423, 1424-27 & nn.14-15, 17
(1982) (noting that liberals draw a public/private distinction and tend to favor expansive private
sector); Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1429-34 (1982) (noting that liberalism insists
upon distinction as means of protecting private spheres from regulation).
15. See e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (offering theory of corrective
justice and arguing that tort law implements this theory); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in
a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002) (offering theory of corrective justice and arguing that
private law, including tort law, embodies that theory). For a summary of contemporary corrective
justice theories, see Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449,
449-50 (1992).
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The fact nevertheless remains that the law and economics

paradigm has had relatively greater explanatory success in
accounting for the traditional areas of private as opposed to public
law.

This explanatory asymmetry has, moreover, lent plausibility

and credibility to the basic conception under discussion. Even when
the conception is neither explicitly held nor held in its entirety, it has

thus had an important, if underappreciated, influence on legal
discussions: it has tended to alter our conception of who bears the
burden of persuasion when deciding the relevance of fairness
considerations to the private law. In my view, the most direct way to
challenge this particular kind of influence would thus be to articulate

a head-on challenge to the explanatory asymmetry under discussion.
One could mount such a challenge by identifying a particularly
robust and pervasive feature of the private law that both resists

economic explanation and is better accounted for from within a
fundamentally contractualist framework.
In this article, I will begin to mount such a challenge. In Part I, I
will begin by focusing attention on a specific private law doctrine:
namely, the expectation damages remedy, which is the standard

remedy for a breach of contract in modem contract law. Economists
have articulated a powerful, and well-known, account of the
expectation damages remedy in terms of so-called "efficient
breach,"17 and this account is often touted as one of the law and

16. There are a number of historical treatments of property law in terms of natural property
rights. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 9-10 (1985) (discussing Locke's view of inherent property rights in response
to Hobbes). More contemporaneously, some have tried to account for special features of modem
property law in terms of natural property rights. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations,
and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1566-68 (2003) (suggesting that
property rights may emanate from sources outside of politics and the law); Eric R. Claeys, PublicUse Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 892-901 (2004)
(arguing that the narrow "public use" limitation for eminent domain actions was an essential
assumption of natural rights theory's conception of property).
17. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against
Compensation in ContractLaw, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1447 (2004) ("Expectation Damages
and Efficient Breach.-The principal economic justification for expectation damages is that it
compels the promisor to internalize the costs that her breach inflicts on the promisee. The
promisor consequently has the incentive to make the efficient breach decision. By internalizing
the promisee's loss, the promisor also has the incentive to take the efficient precautions against
contingencies that threaten to increase the cost of performance.") (citations omitted); see also
Jody S. Kraus, A Critique of the Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
423, 423 (2007), http://yalelawjoumal.org/2007/07/23/kraus.html ("The classic economic justification of contract law's default remedy of expectation damages is grounded on the efficient
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economics movement's clearest successes over promise-based
accounts. Economic accounts of contract law have also proven far
more successful and robust than leading deontological alternatives,
which have typically been framed in terms of principles of autonomy
or the ordinary morality of promise-keeping. 8 If ever there was an
instance of economic explanation that best exhibits the power and
need for economic reasoning, the economic account of this remedy
would therefore appear to be a prime candidate. In Part I, I will
nevertheless argue that there are important features of this remedy
that can neither be explained nor justified in terms of efficiency
maximization. This argument will thus present a direct challenge to
the explanatory power of economic reasoning in an area where this
reasoning purportedly exhibits its greatest success.
Part II will then argue that one can account for those very same
features of the law, both easily and directly, with the aid of
contemporary advances on the nature of obligation, owing primarily
to Stephen Darwall's recent work on the so-called "second-person
standpoint."' 9 This work suggests that in order to give rise to a
genuine obligation, a rule must typically give some person or group
the second-personal standing to make demands on others' wills or
conduct.2 ° This standpoint is a distinctive standpoint, and when we
take it up, we implicitly presuppose a contractualist account of the
right, on Darwall's view.2 ' The relevant account of the right can be
made more precise by extending Rawls' contractualist account of
justice as fairness to questions of private right.22 The remainder of
Part II thus develops a contractualist account of contractual remedies
that is-I will argue-more robust and more powerful than existing
economic alternatives. The arguments in Part II will thus suggest
that the very same features of contract law remedies that evade
breach hypothesis: that promisors should be permitted and encouraged to breach when the net
gains from breach exceed the net gains from performance.").
18. For a representative account of such a deontological account, see CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). For an illuminating discussion of the many distinctions between
contract law and the ordinary morality of promise-keeping, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
19. See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY,
RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
20. Id. at 3-10.
21. Id. at 213-320 (arguing that when we take up the second-person standpoint, we are
implicitly committing ourselves to a form of contractualism).
22. See generally id. (discussing how commitment to contractualism can be cashed out in
Rawlsian terms).
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economic analysis can be better understood from within a
fundamentally contractualist framework; and that this framework
allows for a more robust account of other nuances of remedial
doctrine as well.
The main arguments in this article will focus on contractual
remedies, but the features of these remedies that evade economic
analysis are pervasive to the private law. The arguments presented in
the first two parts will thus illustrate a much broader challenge to the
law and economics paradigm. By way of conclusion, I will suggest
that the arguments presented here are, in fact, best understood as
suggesting that the law and economics movement cannot account for
the very features of private legal obligations that make them genuine
obligations. The arguments in this article will thus give rise to a
direct challenge to the explanatory asymmetry under discussion, and
will suggest the promise and importance of developing contractualist
accounts of a broader range of private law doctrine.
I. WHY EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS CAN NEITHER EXPLAIN NOR
JUSTIFY THE EXPECTATION DAMAGES REMEDY
noted earlier,23 efficiency theories are generally thought

As
of as
providing a particularly powerful explanation of the standard remedy
in modem contract law: the expectation damages remedy. This Part
will scrutinize that claim. In the course of the discussion, I hope to
establish that there are important aspects of this remedy that cannot
ultimately be explained or justified in terms of efficiency
maximization.
To begin the analysis, it will help to canvass the standard
economic account of expectation damages in terms of "efficient
breach." The transition from one state of affairs to another is said to
be "Pareto-efficient" if at least one person would prefer the new state
of affairs to the old one and no one would prefer the old one to the
new. 24 A transition is said to be "Kaldor-Hicks efficient" if,
hypothetically, it could be rendered Pareto-efficient if the 'winners'
in the new state of affairs were to compensate the 'losers' for their
losses. 25 Employing these definitions, efficiency theorists can
23. See supra Introduction.
24. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1516 (2003)
STEVE SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
25. Id. at 1517.

(reviewing LOuIS KAPLOW &
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provide a straightforward explanation of why courts would enforce
purely executory and unrelied-upon contracts in the first place, 26 at
least assuming the parties have entered into them voluntarily.
According to the economist, we reveal our preferences in voluntary
choice,27 and enforcing voluntary exchanges should therefore tend to
produce states of affairs in which both parties will have more of their
Because the enforcement of
expected preferences satisfied. 28
voluntary agreements tends to foster exchanges that are preferred by
both parties to the relevant exchanges, enforcement should produce
gains under both efficiency standards in the standard economic view.
The duty to keep a contract does not, however, typically include
a strict duty to perform it under the common law. Rather, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes has starkly put the issue: "[t]he duty to keep a
contract at common law means... that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it,-and nothing else."29 The damages in question are,
moreover, expectation damages, or the expected value (at the time of
breach) of what the victim of the breach would have obtained had
both parties fully performed.3" So why would a set of rules fashioned
to promote efficiency allow contracting parties to breach and pay
expectation damages? Why would the remedy be only expectation
damages, rather than something larger like punitive damages?
When a party voluntarily breaches a contract and is forced to
pay expectation damages, two consequences are often said to follow.
First, by virtue of obtaining expectation damages, the victims of
breaches are said to be left in the same position they would have
been in if the contracts had been fully performed.31 Second, by
26. This is because there has not yet been any harm caused to the victim of the breach. See
generally Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936) (discussing the purposes behind awarding contract damages, which
especially include protection of a reliance interest, or protection from harm caused by reliance on
a breached contract).
27. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9-11 (2d ed.
1963).
28. See Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 730-31 nn.43-44.
29. OW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). In his full
description of this duty to keep contracts, Holmes inserts a particular account of duty in terms of
predictions of court reactions. This part of his account is controversial, and I have therefore
abstracted from it to present the uncontroversial part of his description in the main text.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 188-226 (2d ed. 1990).
31. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 281 (1970) (citing 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE OF
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requiring nothing more than expectation damages, parties who find
new opportunities to increase their personal welfare by breaching are
given the ability to capitalize on these new opportunities, at least
when these gains are larger than the costs that the victim of the
breach would face absent compensation.32 It is thus sometimes said,
even by critics, that
the program of expectation damages, if faithfully
implemented, satisfies not only the Kald[o]r-Hicks standard
of hypothetical compensation but the more restrictive
Pareto standards of efficiency as well: not only is there a
net social gain for the contracting parties, but no one is left
worse off after breach than before.33
There is something very powerful about this line of argument.
Efficiency principles would appear to provide a unifying explanation
of both why we enforce voluntary exchanges and why we typically
allow for only the recovery of expectation damages. Because the
explanation is consequentialist in nature, it might also appear to
harmonize well with certain features of modem markets, such as
their tendencies to produce vast increases in social wealth and
average per capita income. 4 Explanations like this can thus
encourage the view that markets operate in ways that are distinctive
from, and that serve different purposes than, the basic structure of
society.35
There is, however, another feature of the expectation damages
remedy that has received insufficient attention in the literature and
that is critical to a full understanding of modem contract law. In
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (rev. ed. 1937)); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies,
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 636 n.9 (1988).
32. Craswell, supra note 31, at 636-37.
33. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1989),
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 52, 53 (Randy Barnett ed., 3d ed. 2005). Pareto
efficiency can be distinguished between Pareto optimality and Pareto superiority.
A state of affairs S, is Pareto superior to another, A, if and only if no one prefers A to S
and at least one person prefers S to A. The notion of Pareto optimality is then defined
with respect to Pareto superiority. A state of affairs S is Pareto optimal provided there
is no state of affairs S. that is Pareto superior to it.
Coleman, supra note 24. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency differs more. "One state of affairs, S, is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another, A, if and only if the winners under S could compensate the
losers such that, after compensation, no one would prefer A to S and at least one person would
prefer StoA." Id. at 1517.
34.

JEFFREY B. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY 27-28 (2005).

35. See Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 713.
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particular, the expectation damages remedy-and, indeed, the law of
contract remedies more generally-reflects a conception of
contractual obligation that is fundamentally "agent-centered" (rather
than "agent-neutral") in form. Under orthodox definitions, a
principle is said to be "agent-centered" if it sometimes gives different
persons different aims or goals, and "agent-neutral" if it gives all
persons the same aim or goal.36
To illustrate, an agent-neutral version of a rule prohibiting
people from breaching their contracts would give all people the same
aim: namely, to act so as to reduce the number of contractual
breaches in the world, regardless of who is doing the breaching. This
rule would not only permit but also require people to breach their
own contracts if by doing so they could prevent two or more others
from breaching theirs in equally weighty circumstances. A facially
similar rule prohibiting people from breaching their contracts would
be agent-centered, on the other hand, if-as is the case in the modem
law of contracts-it were to require each person either to fulfill his
or her own contracts or to pay damages to the victims of his or her
own breaches. This latter rule would not allow people to breach their
own contracts in circumstances where they can thereby cause two or
more others to keep theirs in equally weighty circumstances. Given
these descriptions, it should be clear that the modem law of contracts
imposes agent-centered, rather than agent-neutral, obligations on
persons.
The distinction under discussion might seem slight at first, but
the agent-centered features of contractual obligations raise an
important challenge to efficiency theorists. It is widely accepted in
value theory that one cannot easily square the agent-centered features
of rules or obligations with a thoroughgoing consequentialist account
of the right.37 The problem arises because consequentialists take the
36. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 27 (1984); see also Stephen Darwall,
Agent Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out, 50 PHIL. STUD. 291 (1986), reprinted in
DEONTOLOGY 112 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).
37. See, e.g., PARFIT, supra note 36, at 54-55 (1984); SAMUEL SHEFFLER, THE REJECTION
OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 80 (1982); see also Diane Jeske, Special Obligations, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2007), http://plato.stanford
.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/special-obligations ("Common sense morality seems to understand
us as having special obligations to those to whom we stand in some sort of special relationship,
e.g., our friends, our family members, our colleagues, our fellow citizens, and those to whom we
have made promises or commitments of some sort. Special obligations are often appealed to in
arguments against consequentialism, because consequentialism is unable to accommodate agentrelative reasons and genuinely special obligations are agent-relative reasons.").
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values of states of affairs to be fundamental and define the right in
terms of the production of these valuable states of affairs.38 Often,
however, there is nothing in principle to distinguish the disvalue
inherent in one breach of contract from that of another. If the
fundamental reason we prohibit breaches of contract is to minimize
these disvaluable states of affairs, then it will therefore make no
sense to require a person to perform her own contracts in
circumstances where a breach might prevent two or more equally
disvaluable breaches by others.
Efficiency-maximization principles are consequentialist in
nature,39 so some version of this problem should arise for efficiencybased accounts of contract law as well. Indeed, the problem does
arise, and one way to see it is to ask the following question: what
efficiency-based reasons might there be to require people who breach
their contracts to pay expectation damages to the victims of their
own breaches rather than to the victims of other breaches that would
otherwise go uncompensated?" If the efficiency theorist cannot
answer this question, then there will be an important and highly
robust feature of the expectation damages remedy that she can
neither explain nor justify.
Here, then, is the central dilemma for efficiency-based accounts
of the expectation damages remedy: these accounts will have a
difficult time explaining why courts would require breaching parties
to pay expectation damages to the specific victims of their own
38. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11 ("Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view
that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at
different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most
prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that
whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something
related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same
kind."); Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, DeontologicalEthics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethicsdeontological ("Consequentialists . . . must specify initially the states of affairs that are
intrinsically valuable-the Good. They then are in a position to assert that whatever choices
increase the Good, that is, bring about more of it, are the choices that it is morally right to make
and to execute. (The Good in that sense is said to be prior to the Right.)").
39. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is Restitution a
Right or a Remedy?, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1037, 1044 ("The best known contemporary group of
consequentialist theories, 'efficiency' theories, regard private law as promoting the welfare,
understood subjectively, of all members of society."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 1-54 (5th ed. 1998).
40. There are plenty of breaches that will likely go uncompensated. Think of cases in which
a company has filed for bankruptcy, and all of its debts to its creditors have been discharged, or
instances in which it is not feasible to enforce a contract for practical reasons.
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breaches rather than to the victims of other breaches that would
otherwise go uncompensated. This dilemma can be sharpened by
explicitly factoring in the issue of transaction costs. Then the
relevant question would be: why would courts require that breaching
parties pay the specific victims of their own breaches even when
transaction costs would favorpayment to third party victims instead?
In the remainder of this Part, I will discuss three main responses that
efficiency theorists might give to this question. The failures of these
responses will suggest that the problem posed here to the economist
is real.
One initial idea might be to insist that the relevant aim of
contract law rules is to maximize Pareto-efficiency, rather than
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The efficiency theorist might then point
out that while a rule allowing damages to third parties might be
justified on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency grounds, it cannot plausibly be
justified on Pareto-efficiency grounds. This is because the state of
affairs in which a third party were to receive expectation damages
after a breach would leave at least one person (namely, the particular
victim of that breach) worse off than if the contract had been
performed, thus revealing that the transition to this new state of
affairs would not be Pareto-efficient.4' The more orthodox remedial
rule-which requires breaching parties to pay expectation damages
to the specific victims of their breaches-would, by contrast, leave
no party worse off-or so goes the argument-than in the nonbreaching situation and would still allow the breaching party to move
to a state of affairs that is even more preferable to the breaching
party. Unlike the unorthodox rule, this orthodox rule would thus
promote Pareto-efficient results. If the aim of modem contract law
were to maximize Pareto-efficiency rather than Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, then the efficiency theorist might therefore rule out the
unorthodox remedy requiring breaching parties to pay expectation
damages either to the specific victims of their breaches or to other
third party victims of breaches that would otherwise go
uncompensated.
Naturally, this first response is only as strong as its central
premise: namely, that the relevant aim of modem contract law is to
41. Of course, the third party who received the expectation damages might hypothetically fix
this situation by compensating the original victim of the breach; but this just means that the
remedial rule would produce Kaldor-Hicks efficient, rather than Pareto-efficient, results.
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maximize Pareto-efficiency rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.

What should we think of this premise? Certainly, there are some
reasons to favor the view. Perhaps the most important one arises
from the fact that we can fashion rules that promote Pareto-efficiency
even if we lack the ability to make interpersonal utility comparisons.
In particular, we can rely on the weak epistemic premise that we

reveal our preferences in voluntary choice and then recommend rules
that allow all and only those transitions to new states of affairs in
which at least one person would voluntarily choose this new state of
affairs over the old and no one would voluntarily choose the old over
the new. Rules that require the enforcement of voluntary exchanges

appear to fit this basic description, whereas one must typically be
able to make interpersonal utility comparisons to identify KaldorHicks efficient results.4 2 For those who believe that we cannot make
interpersonal utility comparisons,43 it might thus make sense to insist
that the appropriate aim of modem contract law is to maximize
Pareto-efficiency.
There are, on the other hand, a number of equally compelling
reasons to reject this view. As an initial matter, economists have
acknowledged the need to employ Kaldor-Hicks rather than Pareto

criteria to account for every other area of the private law.44 To insist
on the use of Pareto criteria in this one area of the law would

therefore result in a view that is at odds with the larger economic
project of accounting for private law. In addition, one must typically
be able to make interpersonal utility comparisons to identify Kaldor-

42. Coleman, supra note 24, at 1517 ("If the worries about interpersonal comparability are
legitimate, Kaldor-Hicks reintroduces them; it does not solve them.").
43. A number of people have questioned our ability to make interpersonal utility
comparisons. See, e.g., Pierre Lemieux, Social Welfare, State Intervention, and Value Judgments,
11 INDEP. REv. 19, 21 (2006), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir-11 01 02
lemieux.pdf ("The impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility immediately raises a
major problem: How can we talk of 'social welfare' if we can't add the utility of the individuals
who gain ... and deduct the utility of those who lose ... ?"); Julian Lamont & Christi Favor,
DistributiveJustice, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring
ed. 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/ustice-distributive ("Critics have
argued that such interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, even in theory, due to one or
both of the following: (1) It is not possible to combine all the diverse goods into a single index of
'utility' which can measured for an individual; (2) Even if you could do the necessary weighing
and combining of the goods to construct such an index for an individual, there is no conceptually
adequate way of calibrating such a measure between individuals.").
44. Coleman, supra note 24, at 1517, 1519.
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Hicks efficient outcomes.45
This larger economic project thus
presupposes a clear rejection of one of the main grounds for limiting
our attention to Pareto criteria. The view that we cannot make
interpersonal utility comparisons is, in any event, highly
controversial, and probably wrong in the final analysis.4 6 Once the
view has been rejected, it is hard to imagine any satisfying
consequentialist justification for insisting on the maximization of
Pareto rather than Kaldor Hicks efficiency. After all, a Kaldor-Hicks
efficient transition from one state of affairs to another will produce
more overall welfare, even if the transition is not Pareto efficient. To
insist that the relevant aim of modem contract law is to maximize
Pareto efficiency might therefore allow for a straightforward account
of the agent-centered features of the expectation damages remedy,
but it would do so while undermining the prospects, the
presuppositions and the plausibility of the larger economic project of
accounting for private law.
There is also a more immediate problem for the economist who
would claim that the relevant aim of modem contract law is to
promote Pareto efficiency in the present context. For reasons to be
discussed, the economist must ultimately rely on Kaldor-Hicks
criteria to justify use of the expectation damages remedy itself.
Hence, the economist cannot consistently argue for the use of this
remedy and for the view that the aim of modem contract law is to
maximize Pareto-efficiency. It is to that argument that I now turn.
To understand why the economist must implicitly rely on
Kaldor-Hicks criteria to justify the expectation damages remedy,
notice that the standard economic account of this remedy rests on a
critical assumption. It assumes that, at the time of the breach, a party
will be strictly indifferent between obtaining performance of the
contract and obtaining the market value of that performance. Let us
call this the "Strict Indifference Assumption." This assumption can
45. Id. at 1517 ("If the worries about interpersonal comparability are legitimate, KaldorHicks reintroduces them; it does not solve them.").
46. See, e.g., David Pozen, Remapping the CharitableDeduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531,
583 (2006) ("Interpersonal utility comparisons may be taboo in modem economic theory, but
philosophers since Rawls have acknowledged that we inevitably make at least
approximate."); see also Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627, 632
n.9 (2006) (describing assumption that it is impossible to make interpersonal utility comparisons
as "controversial"); cf Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1589, 1625 (2004) ("The lesson, though, is not that objective interpersonal utility
comparisons cannot be made, but that they necessarily involve normative decisions.").
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be broken down into two further ones. First, there is a fungibility
assumption,

according

to

which

contracting

parties

deem

performance of the contracts fungible for the market value of that
performance.
according to

Second, there is a temporal stability assumption,
which contracting parties' valuations of these

performances do not change over time. Importantly, neither of these
assumptions can be derived either from pure economic theory or
from the weak epistemic premise that we reveal our preferences in
voluntary choice. This is because economic theory purports to be
neutral about what people's utility functions look like and to identify
these functions based on voluntary choice. But while the parties to
these contracts may have entered into them voluntarily, the victims

of efficient breaches typically have no choice but to accept
expectation damages as a remedy at the time of breach. "v Hence, if
we believe that parties are indifferent between performance and the
receipt of expectation damages at the time of breach, that belief
cannot be based solely on facts about the parties' voluntary choices.
The belief must be based, at least in part, on additional intuitions
about how people's utility functions typically operate.
Once we acknowledge the need to rely on intuitions like these,
however, it should be clear that the Strict Indifference Assumption is

not even true in all cases. There is, after all, nothing obvious about
the fact that two parties have entered into a contract voluntarily that
would guarantee that the parties will value what they have bargained
for exactly as much once the parties have begun performance.4 8 If
47. Specific performance is limited to special circumstances. See Weathersby v. Gore, 556
F.2d 1247, 1257-59 (5th Cir. 1977); Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 214 S.E.2d 356, 359 (Ga. 1975);
Roberts v. Spence, 209 So. 2d 623, 625-26 (Miss. 1968). Punitive damages are generally
unavailable in contract cases. Strum v. Exxon Co., 15 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1994); Hardin,
Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 628, 638-40 (7th Cir.
1992); Harris v. At. Richfield Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 653-54 (Ct. App. 1993); see also 3
FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 12.8. Finally, agreed-upon (or liquidated) remedies are generally
only binding when they reflect reasonable estimations of expectation damages. See Southpace
Props., Inc. v. Acquisition Group, 5 F.3d 500, 505-06 (1 1th Cir. 1993); A.V. Consultants, Inc. v.
Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th Cir. 1992); Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d
1233, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
48. Valuation changes over time can be linked to an individual's utility function changing
over time. This issue has been discussed extensively in sociological and psychological happiness
research. See Posting of Bryan Caplan, Goods, Bads, Marginal Utility, and Happiness Research,
to EconLog (Mar. 10, 2006), http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2006/03/goods-bads-marg.html.
The issue has also been raised in computer science modeling for artificial intelligence research.
See Thomas D. Nielsen & Finn V. Jensen, Learning a Decision Maker's Utility Functionfrom
(Possibly) Inconsistent Behavior, 160 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 53, 53 (2004), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2004.08.003 (follow "PDF" hyperlink under "This Document");
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the victimized party no longer values the performance as much as
when the party entered the contract, a payment of expectation
damages may thus overcompensate the party, and a rule requiring
expectation damages as a remedy might deter some Pareto-efficient
breaches. If, on the other hand, the victimized party ends up valuing
the performance more than at the time of contracting, then
expectation damages may end up undercompensating this party,
thereby making this party worse off and establishing that the breach
is not Pareto-efficient. Additionally, our intuitions tell us that people
sometimes begin to value items-even ones they have obtained
through market transactions-in ways that surpass the market value,
either because people have formed special attachments to the items
or because people no longer deem them to be commodifiable.49
Hence, people may not always be strictly indifferent, even from the
start, between performance and expectation damages.
My purpose in raising these points is not to suggest that the
economist can provide no plausible rationale for the expectation
damages remedy. To provide such a rationale, the economist must,
however, apparently rely on considerations that differ in some ways
from those canvassed in the Strict Indifference Assumption. The
implicit argument needed to make the account work would appear to
go something like this: although people's utility functions might
change over time, people's evaluations of contractual performances
are likely to change in approximately equal amounts, such that the
typical increases for one party will-at least statistically speakingbe offset by the typical decreases of the other. (Let us call this the
"Statistical and Interpersonal Temporal Indifference Thesis.")
Hence, requiring the payment of expectation damages and nothing
more to the victim of a breach will tend to promote gains in overall
see also Robert F. Bordley, An Intertemporal Utility Function Concave in Gains and Convex in
Losses, 19 ANNALS OPERATIONS RES. 171, 171 (1989) (discussing the utility function and its
relation to expectations).
49. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1906 (1987)
("To understand [particulars of personhood] as monetizable or completely detachable from the
person-to think, for example, that the value of one person's moral commitments is
commensurate or fungible with those of another, or that the 'same' person remains when her
moral commitments are subtracted-is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to
be human."); cf Lane v. Oil Delivery, Inc., 524 A.2d 405, 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(discussing "the actual or intrinsic value of the property to the owner"); Landers v. Municipality
of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614, 620 (Alaska 1996) (declining to adopt the standard "which allows
damages for loss of items of personal property to be based on sentimental and emotional value").
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preference-satisfaction, even if in some cases one party is left worse
off than in the non-breaching situation.
Notice that this argument has a number of special properties. It
is probabilistic in nature; it depends upon a capacity to make credible
interpersonal utility comparisons of a kind; and it relies on intuitions
about people's utility functions that cannot be derived strictly from
facts about their voluntary actions. Properly construed, the argument
thus suggests that allowing for expectation damages as a remedy will
promote Kaldor-Hicks rather than Pareto-efficiency. But this means
that the economist cannot consistently account for the basic
expectation damages remedy (as needed to promote Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency) and for the agent-centered features of the remedy (as
needed to promote Pareto-efficiency).
This brings us back to the main question in this section: how, if
at all, might the efficiency theorist account for the fact that courts
require breaching parties to pay expectation damages to the specific
victims of their breaches rather than to the victims of other breaches
that might otherwise go uncompensated?
The economist's first
response rested on the view that the relevant aim of modem contract
law is to maximize Pareto rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. For
reasons just discussed, however, the economist cannot plausibly
maintain this view in the present context.
The economist might nevertheless try a second response, which
grants the need to employ Kaldor-Hicks criteria, along with
everything else that has been said thus far. In particular, she might
argue that the orthodox rule, which requires breaching parties to pay
expectation damages to the specific victims of their breaches, is more
likely to produce Kaldor-Hicks efficient results than its unorthodox
competitor. For reasons already discussed, the efficiency theorist
must assume that we have more knowledge about the routes to
human preference satisfaction than is derived solely from
observations of people's voluntary choices. The efficiency theorist
might nevertheless argue that voluntary exchanges produce
information about the routes to human preference satisfaction that
cannot easily be reproduced in other manners." This is presumably
50. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 524-26
(1945); see also Posting of Elizabeth Anderson, How Not to Complain About Your Taxes (III): "I
deserve my pretax income," Left2Right (Jan. 26, 2005), http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2005/
0 1/how not to comp_1 .html (proposing that taxation builds social insurance).
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why centralized state planning has proven far less workable than
modem market economies for the distribution of resources. 1 The
voluntariness of an original transaction, when combined with the
very minimal intuitions about people's utility functions discussed
above, can thus support an inference that a rule requiring breaching
parties to pay the specific victims of their breaches will very likely
produce Kaldor-Hicks efficient results. There has, however, been no
analogous voluntary exchange between a breaching party and any
given third party to a transaction, and there is thus less evidence-on
this view-that payment to a third party would produce these same
Kaldor-Hicks efficient results. If this argument were valid, then the
orthodox expectation damages remedy might therefore be more
likely to produce Kaldor-Hicks efficient results than the unorthodox
one.
It is quite plausible, in my view, that voluntary market
transactions produce information about the routes to human
preference-satisfaction that cannot easily be reproduced in other
manners." In at least some circumstances, the evidence generated by
voluntary market transactions will thus be more credible than other
evidence we might have about the routes to human preference
satisfaction. Yet, even granting these propositions, there is nothing
in principle to distinguish the evidentiary value inherent in one
voluntary exchange from that of another similarly situated exchange.
These same considerations should therefore equally support a very
different doctrine of "efficient breach," which requires breaching
parties to pay expectation damages either to the other party to the
contract, or to some other person who is the victim of a similar
breach that would otherwise go uncompensated. Because this
different doctrine of "efficient breach" is nothing other than the
unorthodox remedy that the economist is trying to rule out, this
second response by the economist is equally unavailing.
A third and final response that the efficiency theorist might try
relates to the importance of trust for modem markets to flourish.
Parties must presumably trust that they will obtain what they expect
from a contract if they are to enter into the typical contract. 3 The
51.

Anderson, supra note 50.

52. Id.
53. See Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What Is So Problematic in
the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 545, 558
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efficiency theorist might therefore argue that only a rule requiring
breaching parties to pay expectation damages to the specific victims
of their breaches will produce this particular kind of trust.5

4

This is

because a person deciding whether to enter into a contract must trust
that he or she will obtain a relevant remedy in case of a breach, and a
rule allowing damages to be paid to third parties would not produce
this particular kind of trust. Given the undeniable fact that markets
tend to produce vast increases in social welfare and average per
capita income,55 the more orthodox rule governing expectation
damages might therefore be thought to conduce to Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency by helping to produce the relevant kind of trust needed for
modem markets to operate.
This last argument from trust will, however, also prove
unhelpful for the efficiency theorist at this stage. The argument rests
on two propositions: first, that markets depend on trust to function,
and second, that this trust is undermined when a person who is
deciding whether to enter into a contract cannot count on a personal
remedy for its breach. There is, however, nothing yet inherent in
these propositions that would distinguish the overall effects on trust
that arise from the breach of one contract from that of another
similarly situated contract. Hence, there will presumably be some
circumstances in which it would undermine people's trust in markets
even more to require a person to pay the specific victim of his breach
rather than to compensate two or more others who are victims of
similar breaches that would otherwise go uncompensated. What
matters for markets to flourish is the overall amount of trust that
(2002) ("Trust, like contract-making, is future-oriented. '[T]o trust is to act as if the uncertain
future actions of others were indeed certain.' 'In trusting, one engages in action as though there
were only certain possibilities in the future.'
Contract-making, therefore, is a functional
equivalent of trust." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and
Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972) ("Virtually every commercial transaction has
within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can
be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by
the lack of mutual confidence .. "). For more information on the phenomenon of trust in
general, see BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES: THE SEARCH FOR THE BASES
OF SOCIAL ORDER passim (1996); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY 152-53 (1995); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 91-116 (1990); DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 55 (1990).
54. See Simon Deakin et al., Contract Law, Trust Relations, and Incentives for CoOperation:A Comparative Study, in CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPETITION 105, 12223, 125 (Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie eds., 1997).
55. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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people have in the market, and the efficiency theorist's third
response will therefore also prove unhelpful.
Apart from these three main responses, there are, undoubtedly, a
number of other ways that an efficiency theorist might try to rule out
the unorthodox remedy under discussion. The failures of the above
responses nevertheless illustrate a more general point. In each case,
the efficiency theorist has tried to justify the orthodox remedial rule
by identifying specific features of the contracting situation that
would appear to favor the orthodox remedy. Consequentialists do
not, however, respect the separateness of persons, and the typical
consequences that flow from one contracting situation are therefore
evaluatively indistinguishable for them from the typical
consequences that flow from any other similarly situated contracting
situation.
The efficiency theorist will therefore find it very
difficult-if not impossible-to provide consequentialist reasons to
reproduce the standard concern for the separateness of private
relations that is found in the modem law of contracts.
What the above considerations show is that efficiency
considerations very likely cannot-as is commonly supposed both by
efficiency theorists and many of their critics--either explain or
justify important features of our standard contractual remedies. They
cannot explain why contractual remedies are owed to specific people,
who are the specific victims of the contractual breaches. This aspect
of contractual remedies is, however, so widespread and so basic that
it would be almost unthinkable to reject it. Yet on closer scrutiny,
there is nothing relating to efficiency maximization that would
recommend that this particular feature of contractual remedies
remain so robust.
II. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION, CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES, AND THE
SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT

The problems canvassed in the last Part all arise from specific
and pervasive features of contractual obligations. It will therefore
help to consider more thoroughly what contractual obligations are.
Contractual obligations are a species of what Joseph Raz has
called "voluntary obligations"-or obligations that people can
voluntarily incur by engaging in specific, avoidable actions with

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 40:977

known normative implications. 6 Many of the rules of contract law
are also instances of what H.L.A. Hart has called "power-conferring
rules," or rules that give us the power to vary our normative relations
with one another. 7 Combining these two thoughts, one might
profitably view the rules of modem contract law as devices that give
us the ability to generate new and self-imposed obligations through
specific, and conventionally defined, voluntary actions. What the
preceding section suggests, then, is that these obligations have
persistent features that cannot be fully explained or justified in purely
economic terms. In particular, contractual obligations are typically
owed by specific persons to specific other persons, who are the
parties to the relevant contracts. Contract law thus gives rise to socalled "agent-centered" restrictions on action, or restrictions that
"purport[] to give each agent a different aim or goal, namely that he
or she fulfill a given requirement, even if by failing to do so he or she
could cause two or more others to fulfill the requirement in equally
weighty circumstances." 58
Elsewhere, I have diagnosed the inability of consequentialist
standards to account for the agent-centered and relational features of
obligation as arising from the fact that these standards are wholly
first- and third-personal in form. 9 I have defined the "first-person
standpoint" as the standpoint that we take up when we "ask
questions, or come to conclusions, the validity of which depend on
their capacity to govern us, rationally, as deliberating agents."6 (A
prime example of this is when we take up the perspective of
deliberation and ask, in effect, "How should I act?") I have defined
the "third-person standpoint" as the standpoint we take up when we
"ask questions, or come to conclusions, the validity of which are
independent both of their relations to us and our relations to one
another."'" (Prime examples of such questions are questions about
56. Joseph Raz, Promises in Mortality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 916, 929 (1982)
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). Voluntary obligations are ones
where "first, the agent is aware of their normative implications, and second, he can avoid them.
Finally, the agent's belief that he will incur an obligation by his action is a positive reason for
holding him bound by his action." Id.
57. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26-42 (2d ed. 1994).
58. Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO L.J. 393,
429 (forthcoming 2008) (citing PARFIT, supra note 36, at 27; Darwall, supra note 36, at 291).
59. Id. at 430-35.
60. Id. at 426.
61. Id.

Spring 2007]

CONTRACT LA W

the world or value.) Darwall's work suggests, however, that there is
a distinctive standpoint-namely, the "second-person standpoint"which is irreducible to these other two and that has been
underappreciated in much of the contemporary moral, political, and
economic literature.6 2 The "second-person standpoint" is "the
perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge
claims on one another's conduct and will,"63 and it has a number of
special features. The purpose of this Part is to explore how this work
might be used to develop a particularly robust account of contract
law remedies.
I should begin by clarifying what precisely I will be relying on
in Darwall's work. First, there is a point about the nature of
obligation. As Darwall has argued, we cannot understand the
specific authority that obligations purport to have without seeing
them as giving some person or group the second-personal standing to
demand compliance. 6 We are, moreover, fated to interact with one
another from the second-person standpoint, and when we make
second-personal demands, we implicitly presume specific
interpersonal authority relations that can both explain and justify the
agent-centered (and relational) features of contractual obligations in
a straightforward manner.65 This does not mean that the relations we
presume necessarily give rise to private, as opposed to public,
standing to demand compliance with contractual rules. But it does
mean that we cannot understand modem contract law as giving rise
to genuine obligations without giving some person or group the
second-person standing to demand compliance with these rules.
Second, there is a point about the intrinsic relationship between
the claims we make from the second-person standpoint and a
contractualist account of the right. As Darwall has observed, when
we make demands on one another's conduct, we are interacting with
62. Id. at 425 (citing DARWALL, supra note 19; Stephen Darwall, Autonomy in Modern
NaturalLaw, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF AUTONOMY 110, 115-16 (Natalie Brender &
Larry Krasnoff eds., 2004); Stephen Darwall, Because I Want It, 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 129,
129-30 (2001) [hereinafter Darwall, Because I Want It]; Stephen Darwall, Moore, Normativity,
and Intrinsic Value, 113 ETHICS 468 (2003)).
63. DARWALL, supra note 19, at 3.
64. Id. at 3-10.
65. Id.; see also Kar, supra note 58, at 425 ("[Claims from the second-personal standpoint]
presuppose that the addresser and addressee stand in specific authority relations to one another,
ones which are sufficient to give the addresser the relevant standing to raise the claim to that
addressee.").
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one another from the second-person standpoint, and the legitimacy of
our claims will therefore depend in part on whether they are
justifiable to the addressees of our demands.66 Facts like these
suggest that we are implicitly committed to a contractualist account
of what we owe to one another in these interactions.67 Elsewhere, I
have discussed Darwall's arguments for these two points in more
detail, and have argued for their extension from moral to legal
obligations.6" Rather than repeat those arguments here, I will focus
on the implications of these propositions for contract law.
Contractualism comes in a number of different forms, and some
of them might even be thought to validate consequentialist principles
of the right.69 Our aim here is, however, to account for pervasive
features of contract law that evade economic analysis, and to do so in
a way that might harmonize this area of the law with other areas of
law, including areas of public law. In what follows, I will therefore
limit my attention to Rawls' version of contractualism, in part
because of its operationality, 7° and in part because it has been
specifically fashioned to identify principles that will plausibly
survive the process of achieving wide reflective equilibrium with a
broad range of public law doctrine.71 Importantly, Rawls' version of
66. See DARWALL, supra note 19, at 11-14; see also T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and
Utilitarianism,in CONTRACTARIANISM/CONTRACTUALISM 219, 227 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2002)
("Those who are concerned with morality look for principles for application to their imperfect
world which they could not reasonably reject, and which other in this world, who are not now
moved by the desire for agreement, could not reasonably reject should they come to be so
moved."); id. at 229 ("[M]orality applies to a being if the notion of justification to a being of that
kind makes sense.").
67. DARWALL, supra note 19, at 300; Stephen Darwall, Because I Want It, supra note 62, at
129-30.
68. Kar, supra note 58, at 424-30.
69. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-UtilitarianNotes on Rawls's Theory of
Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 245-50 (1973) (reviewing RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note
10); John Harsanyi, Bayesian Decision Theory and UtilitarianEthics, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 223
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488-502 (1980); Hal. R. Varian, DistributiveJustice,
Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness,4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 228-29, 240 (1974);
see also Derek Parfit, Climbing the Mountain 207-68 (Dec. 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
availableat http://individual.utoronto.ca/stafforini/parfit/parfit_-_climbing-the-Mountain.pdf.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54 (discussing operationality).
71. See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 67-68 (2002) ("Rawls
admits to modifying the original position in order to make sure that it yields principles which
match our intuitions .... This may sound like cheating. But it only appears so if we take Rawls
to be claiming that [the social contract and our intuitions] provide entirely independent support
for one another.... [H]e admits that the two arguments are interdependent, both drawing on the
same set of considered intuitions."). I have no reason to believe that the results of this inquiry
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contractualism will not validate consequentialist principles of the
right.72
Adopting a Rawlsian framework, the critical question to ask is
thus: what remedies for the breach of contract, if any, would rational
parties adopt in the original position and from behind a veil of
ignorance? This question can be broken down into a number of more
finely grained ones.
By working through these questions in
sequence, I will, in what follows, develop a contractualist account of
the standard contract law remedies that is more robust and more
penetrating than the standard economic accounts. Some attention
will also be paid to the assumptions needed to make the account
work, and to the ultimate plausibility of these assumptions.
The first question to ask is why rational persons would adopt
rules that give anyone else at all the standing to demand that they
comply with their contractual commitments. Typically, it will
require some self-sacrifice to fulfill a contractual obligation, and
rational persons should therefore only be willing to consent to such
enforcement if enforcement is necessary to achieve some further
self-interested aims. The primary circumstance in which this occurs
is when a person hopes to use a contractual promise to induce one or
more others to act in ways that would be even more beneficial to the
promisor than what the promisor expects to lose by fulfilling the
obligation.
Promises of this kind are, however, made to specific persons,
and are intended to induce specific persons to act in these ways.
They take place within specific interpersonal relations. In order to
determine whether rational persons behind a veil of ignorance would
consent to a rule allowing others the standing to demand compliance,
we must therefore ask a further question, concerning when, if ever,
these second-personal inducements might be non-coercive-i.e., in
the specific sense that rational persons behind a veil of ignorance
would allow themselves to be induced by others in these manners.
The answer would appear to be: when the promisee can expect to
obtain more from the person who is doing the inducing (i.e., as a
result of having the standing to demand compliance) than she expects
to lose by being so induced. In these and only these circumstances
would be significantly different under Scanlon's version of contractualism. See, e.g., Scanlon,
supra note 66.
72. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 130-53.
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will the promisee willingly trade the inducement by the promisor for
the standing to demand compliance with the promise.
The above considerations help to guarantee that contracting
parties interact with one another only with the aid of rules that are
justifiable to both from an impartial perspective.
There are,
however, no analogous reasons for rational persons to consent to a
broader rule granting standing either to third parties or to the
government to demand compliance with a contract. For reasons
already explained, rational persons would presumably opt for the
narrowest rules of standing possible because compliance with a
contract will typically require some self-sacrifice. A broader rule of
standing would thus overburden promising parties without providing
any additional justification to the promisee for the promisor's ability
to induce the promisee by means of the promise. Contractualism
should therefore recommend a strong default rule allowing the
parties to contracts, and only those parties, to demand compliance
with a contract.
The second relevant question to ask is why this standing to
demand compliance would extend to purely executory contracts,
which have not yet been relied upon by the non-breaching party.
Absent some reliance on a contract, a promisee will typically be
unable to identify any genuine harm resulting from the noncompliance.73 Parties reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance
might thus be thought to favor a rule that excuses non-performance
before there has been any reliance.
This line of reasoning nevertheless ignores a number of
important facts about modem exchanges.
There are-I will
assume-numerous exchanges at any given time that would be
mutually beneficial to two parties. In small groups, where people
have sufficient trust, care, and intimate knowledge of one another's
concerns and interests, these exchanges often take place without the
need for any legal intervention-either through processes of socalled gift exchange, or other forms of informal cooperation.74 In
circumstances where people are relative strangers, however, selfinterested bargaining is often needed to identify exchanges that will
73. See Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 810 (1941).
74.

See generally MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN

ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (examining the exchange of gifts and the
obligation of reciprocation in different cultures).
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be mutually beneficial, and often does in fact identify these
Rational persons deliberating behind a veil of
exchanges.75
ignorance can know facts like these. 76 Given this knowledge, they
would presumably agree to a rule that allows contracting parties to
demand compliance with a contract prior to reliance, because they
can foresee that they will typically gain from such a rule whether
they end up being the victim of a breach or the breaching party. This
follows from the fact that the agreement was entered into voluntarily,
thereby suggesting that its enforcement will likely conduce to the
mutual benefit of both parties. Rational persons will-in other
words-adopt this rule to obtain its expected benefits.
A third question to ask is why recovery would typically be
limited to expectation damages and nothing more. Although I have
questioned the validity of the Strict Indifference Assumption in the
preceding part, I have also suggested that there are circumstances in
which parties should favor a rule requiring expectation damages and
nothing more.77 These are circumstances in which the parties
contract primarily for economic gain, and in which their evaluations
of the benefits of the agreement will tend to vary in roughly equal
and opposite amounts from the time of execution through
performance.7" When these assumptions hold, people reasoning from
behind a veil of ignorance would presumably agree to a rule that
requires contracting parties to excuse one another's non-performance
so long as the breaching party is willing to pay expectation damages
to the victim of the breach. This is because the victims would not
lose anything of value by accepting expectation damages in these
circumstances, and because both parties would obtain the ability to
capitalize on new sources of increased welfare production that arise
Put differently, rational persons
from changed circumstances.
75. See Hayek, supra note 50, at 526.
76. See, e.g., RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 119 (discussing how
deliberators behind the veil of ignorance should have general knowledge of the basic principles of
economics, politics, sociology and psychology); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 90 (2001)
(noting that those behind the veil of ignorance should be assumed to know "the plain truths now
common and available to citizens generally"); see also Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in
READING RAWLS 1, 7 (Normal Daniels ed., 1989) (observing that the deliberators deliberating
behind Rawls' veil of ignorance still "possess general knowledge about economics, politics, and
sociology and they know that the circumstances of justice, conflicting interests and moderate
scarcity, obtain").
77. See supra Part I.
78. See id.
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deliberating from behind a veil of ignorance would agree to a rule
requiring such an excuse because it would allow them to obtain
greater advantages in some circumstances (i.e., those that are
typically thought of prime cases for "efficient breach"), while losing
very little or nothing in situations where the other party has decided
to pay rather than perform.
Notice, moreover, that this contractualist account of the
expectation damages remedy views the doctrine not as a concession
to warranted breaches, but rather as a rule that requires parties to
excuse one another's non-performance and pay expectation damages
in circumstances where that larger set of actions will serve a deeper
cooperative purpose. The account thus squares the remedy with
basic cooperative features of contractualist accounts of the right,
rather than suggesting that efficiency considerations can trump
private right.
So when, precisely, are the assumptions needed to generate the
above contractualist account of the expectation damages remedy
true? Ultimately, this is an empirical question, which will require
learning more about how specific contracting parties typically value
the things that they hope to exchange. One of the assumptionsnamely, what I have called the "Statistical and Interpersonal
Temporal Indifference Thesis"-is, in my view, a pretty good, if
somewhat rough, guide to the truth. The other assumption-namely,
the "Fungibility Assumption"-is not, however, very plausible at all,
in my view, in the kinds of intimate circumstances that define close
Reciprocal promises are not, however,
personal relationships.
typically enforced in those circumstances anyway.79 Reciprocal
promises are, on the other hand, typically enforced when they
involve exchanges between relative strangers, and it is much more
79. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Reconsidering GratuitousPromises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40
(1992) (observing that courts are typically reluctant to enforce family promises); Melanie B.
Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 551, 551 (1999) (arguing that while enforcement of reciprocity norms is seen "not in breach
of promise suits, which occur rarely between family members," enforcement of these norms can
instead be seen "in will contests"); Mary Keyes & Kylie Bums, Contract and the Family:
Whither Intention?, 26 MELB. U. L. REv. 577, 593 (2002) (noting "the common law's continued
reluctance to enforce family agreements," though arguing that this reluctance may be formalistic
and pointless); Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071, 1130 (2005) (noting the "traditional reluctance of the common law
to intervene in contracts made among family members" and suggesting that this tradition "reflects
the implicit judgment that formal legal enforcement of these promises adds little to their efficient
level of enforcement beyond that provided by informal extralegal enforcement of family ties").
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plausible that the Fungibility Assumption is true-or at least
typically true-in these circumstances. This is because parties in
market transactions are often-though not always-driven primarily
either by the prospects of economic gain or by interests in goods or
services that they take to be relatively fungible and obtainable from
multiple places on an open market."0
What a contractualist
framework would seem to recommend, then, is a default rule

allowing for expectation damages as the standard remedy in these
common circumstances of market exchange-which, as it turns out,

are the typical circumstances in which contracts are enforced.
These last remarks lead to a final question, which is when, if

ever, rational persons behind a veil of ignorance would allow for
exceptions to the expectation damages remedy. The short answer is:
when the assumptions needed to justify the expectation damages
remedy no longer hold.
Presumably, there will be some
circumstances in which people engage in exchanges for items that
they do not deem fungible for others, or that they value in ways that
cannot easily be reduced to monetary terms.8' In circumstances such
as these, rational persons would presumably favor a rule requiring
specific performance instead82-at least on the assumption that the
special way that the person values the exchange has been made clear
to the other party. This is because specific performance would allow
people who specially value items to enforce these exchanges by
80. Both critics and supporters of modem market economies have tended to agree that these
economies generate exchanges that are ruled primarily by profit motives. See, e.g., Thomas L.
Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of HumanitarianSensibility, Part2, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 547,
549 (1985) ("After nearly two centuries of criticism of market society, it is easy to forget how
brutal life could be before the profit motive ruled supreme and how moderate, in the long
perspective of human history, the capitalist's license for aggression really is."); RICHARD M.
TITMUSS, THE GIFT OF RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 225 (1971)
("[T]he ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions can encourage or
discourage the altruistic in man."). Although it would be wrong to assume that the profit motive
is the only motivation for all modem market exchanges, it is also clear that profit motives play a
very large role in generating a large amount of modem market activity and market exchange.
81. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 1906 ("To understand [particulars of personhood] as
monetizable or completely detachable from the person-to think, for example, that the value of
one person's moral commitments is commensurate or fungible with those of another, or that the
'same' person remains when her moral commitments are subtracted-is to do violence to our
deepest understanding of what it is to be human.").
82. The remedy of specific performance typically consists of an injunction requiring the
breaching party to perform as promised in the original contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981) ("An order of specific performance is intended to produce as
nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance due under a contract would have
produced. It usually, therefore, orders a party to render the performance that he promised.").
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obtaining the items themselves, and because these persons will
presumably always value these items more than their market value.
The only cost of the rule would be the inability to capitalize on the
possibility of increased welfare gains that might otherwise give rise
to a so-called "efficient breach." The chances of such gains are,
however, speculative, and, in this special context, must be balanced
against the known losses that will arise absent a right to specific
performance.
Other circumstances in which rational persons might plausibly
forgo the opportunity to pay expectation damages in lieu of
performance would be instances in which expectation damages are
unlikely to make the victim of a breach whole for some other reason,
or are particularly difficult to calculate. Hence, rational persons
deliberating behind a veil of ignorance would presumably allow for
specific performance in these limited classes of circumstances as
well.
Interestingly, the modem law of contract remedies does reflect
just these sorts of exceptions. Although expectation damages are the
typical remedy for breach of contract, 3 parties may seek specific
performance in cases where the items in question are "unique or in
other proper circumstances." 4 In practice, this test tends to cover
situations in which one party has formed a special attachment to an
item, as in cases of family heirlooms;85 where expectation damages
are unlikely to make the victim of the breach whole; 6 or when
damages are difficult to calculate. 7 The fact that a contractualist
account of contract law remedies would recommend exceptions to
83. Id. § 347 & cmt. a; see supra Part I.
84. U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) ("Specific
performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the
expectation interest of the injured party."); see also sources cited supra note 47 (listing cases
explaining how rare specific performance is as a remedy).
85. U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(b) & cmt. b; see
Burr v. Bloomsburg, 138 A. 876 (N.J. Ch. 1927) (ordering a widow to return a ring to the sister of
the deceased because the sister's legal remedies were inadequate due to the ring's sentimental
value).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360; see U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 2; Weathersby
v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1257-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that damages are more appropriate than
specific performance for a contract for the sale of cotton because cotton is not unique and the
buyer could obtain it on the open market).
87. U.C.C. § 2-716; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a); Hogan v.
Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437, 439-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that specific performance
was proper to enforce a contract for the sale of a business where damages would be difficult to
calculate).
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the expectation damages remedy in just these sorts of circumstances
provides further support for the robustness of the present account.
A contractualist approach to contract law remedies, rooted in
Darwall's recent work on the second-person standpoint, can thus
provide a plausible and unified account of (1) the agent-centered
features of contractual obligation, (2) the fact that we allow parties to
enforce contracts even before there has been any reliance, (3) the fact
that the standard remedy for a contractual breach is expectation
damages, and (4) the fact that we see deviations from the expectation
damages remedy in the precise circumstances that we do. By
contrast, the standard economic account of the expectation damages
remedy helps with only (2) and (3). By suggesting that efficiency
considerations can trump private right, the standard economic
account is also inconsistent with the basic obligatory nature of
private law.
In my view, none of this should be particularly surprising after
due reflection. Adjudications of contract law disputes are not, in
fact, viewed merely as opportunities for courts to make increases in
net social welfare;" they are instead viewed as opportunities to
decide whether a specific plaintiff who is a contractingparty, is
owed a remedyfrom a specific defendantfor his or her breach. This
entire set of facts can be accounted for in a unified manner from a
contractualist standpoint, whereas the agent-centered and relational
features of contractual obligations can neither be explained nor
justified in terms of efficiency maximization. For reasons just
discussed, contractualism can also provide a more penetrating
account of a number of other features of remedial doctrine. These
facts should thus cast significant doubt on the overarching claims
that the law and economics movement has sometimes made to
articulate the deep principles that animate this area of the private law.

88. Cf Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 197 (2000) (discussing justice theory of tort law as compared
to economic conceptions (citing JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303-28 (1992);
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 24 (1999); ERNEST J. WEINRIB,
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 537, 547 (1972))).

1008

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:977

1II. CONCLUSION

I began this article by observing that, as things presently stand,
there is a common perception that the law and economics movement
has been far more successful at explaining areas of private as
opposed to public law doctrine. Facts like these have sometimes lent
credibility to a particular conception of how our private relations
with one another differ from our relations with the government.
According to this view, the deep principles that govern our private
legal relations are decidedly consequentialist in nature, and
principles like those of fairness and justice only have legitimate
application to our relationships with the state.
My purpose in this article has been to cast doubt on this basic
conception. To that end, I have focused attention on a specific legal
doctrine-namely, the expectation damages remedy-which is both
central to the private law and often thought to best illustrate the
importance and need of economic reasoning. I have argued that, on
closer scrutiny, the doctrine nevertheless has features that can neither
be explained nor justified in terms of efficiency maximization. I
have also developed a distinctive, contractualist account of this area
of doctrine, which draws on Darwall's recent work on the secondperson standpoint, and which better accounts for the full set of facts
about contractual remedies.
Because the main arguments in this article focus on one specific
doctrine, it is important neither to overstate nor understate the
generality of the conclusions to be drawn. It would significantly
overstate things to conclude that a contractualist can necessarily
provide a better account of the full range of private law doctrine than
the economist. Any support for such a view would have to depend
on the details of the competing accounts, and the relevant
contractualist alternatives have not yet been fully developed. The
above arguments nevertheless suggest that contractualism provides a
better framework for understanding key areas of private law doctrine,
which have typically been thought to require economic analysis. The
arguments also suggest that contractual obligations have robust and
pervasive features that evade economic analysis. It should therefore
be worth our time and effort to try to extend contractualist accounts
to a broader range of private law doctrine.
It would, on the other hand, vastly understate the importance of
the arguments presented here to think that they relate only to the
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expectation damages remedy. The arguments in this article draw on
key insights about the nature of obligation, which Darwall has
recently brought to our attention, and illustrate those insights in the
context of contract law remedies. The insights themselves are,
however, not limited to contract law. To the contrary, they suggest
that we cannot understand the particular authority that obligations of
any kind purport to have without seeing them as giving some person
or group the second-person standing to demand compliance. When
we make such claims, we engage in specific forms of interpersonal
interaction, however, and these interpersonal relations cannot be
understood from within a purely economic framework. We also
show ourselves to be implicitly committed to a contractualist account
of the right, which is not only inconsistent with principles of
efficiency maximization and but is also in deeper harmony with
principles that more plausibly govern our individual relations with
the government. The agent-centered and relational features of
contract law remedies are, in any event, also common to all areas of
the private law, and the law and economics paradigm cannot
plausibly account for these features, whereas a contractualist account
of the private law, rooted in Darwall's recent work on the secondperson standpoint, can.
Properly construed, the arguments in this article thus illustrate a
broad challenge to the law and economics movement. They suggest,
in effect, that the law and economics movement cannot account for
the very features of private law obligations that make them private
obligations. But this means that the arguments presented here
provide a direct challenge to the view that the law and economics
movement can better account for private as opposed to public law
doctrine, along with the view that our private legal relations are
governed by a decidedly consequentialist standard of the right. That
conception should therefore be discarded in favor of a view that
takes more seriously the second-personal aspects of our private legal
interactions with one another.
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